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The focus on ￿scal federalism and the potential role of local governments in dis-
ciplining an excessive growth of public expenditure, has considerably increased
in the recent years, following a remarkable growth of the public sector in indus-
trialized countries. The debate on ￿scal federalism is even more pressing for the
European Monetary Union member countries, given the budgetary constraints
they are subject to.
Traditional public ￿nance analysis emphasizes the advantages of ￿scal de-
centralization, as local governments have an informational advantage on central
governments with respect to local costs and demand conditions, allowing them,
under some conditions, to better satisfy local demands and deliver public ser-
vices at a lower cost for public funds (see on this, Oates 1972, 1999). On the
other hand, second generation models of ￿scal federalism point to the existence
of con￿ icting objectives between local and central governments, casting some
doubts on the e⁄ectiveness of ￿scal decentralisation (Oates, 2005). Besley and
Coate (2003), in particular, introduce a political economy model where the con-
￿ ict of interests between central and local administrations results in excessive
spending by local governments. The soft-budget constraint of local governments
is also analysed in Kornai et al. (2003).
In the light of the discussion above, it becomes very important to analyse
more in detail the relationships among the spending and taxing decisions of local
governments and the level of transfers received from higher levels of government.
For this purpose, the empirical analysis on the revenues-expenditure patterns of
local governments is traditionally based on the implicit assumption of symme-
try: e.g. local expenditure is expected to increase and decrease symmetrically
1following changes in unconditional transfers received and own resources. To the
best of our knowledge, very few studies have considered possible asymmetries
and non-linearities in local ￿scal policy, as in Gamkar and Oates (1996), Stine
(1994) and Heyndels (2001).
Using annual time-series data for Italian municipalities, our paper examines
the relationship between local revenues and expenditures in a non-linear frame-
work. The analysis of Italy is of particular interest, not only because Italy is an
EMU country, but also because it introduced some important reforms, where
the country initially strenghtened its centralisation process, only to subsequently
enhance the delegation of spending powers to local authorities.
There are two main di⁄erences between our paper and the studies mentioned
above. First, we use the Johansen (1988, 1995) multivariate cointegration tech-
nique, which allows for long-run properties and short-run dynamics of local
expenditure, taxation and state transfers to be jointly analyzed, allowing for
possible endogeneity of the variables1. Second, we allow for asymmetric and
non-linear adjustment to disequilibrium deviations of the ￿scal variables from
their equilibrium levels, following the methodology introduced by Escribano and
Granger (1998).
We ￿nd evidence of a "strong" ￿ y-paper e⁄ect, in the form of a high transfer-
elasticity of local spending, associated with an insigni￿cant long-run e⁄ect of
local taxation. This means that local spending is ultimately driven only by the
size of transfers received, regardless of the ability of local governments to raise
revenues from their own resources.
The adoption of non-linear modelling allows us to report asymmetric ad-
1Knight (2002) argues that transfers are the result of a political bargaining process and
therefore should be considered as endogenous.
2justment, in the form of downward in￿ exibility of both local expenditure and
taxation. When local expenditure is below its equilibrium level with transfers,
it raises relatively fast, while when it is below, its reduction is not statistically
signi￿cant. In the case of municipal taxation, taxes raise faster when they are
below their equilibrium level, than they reduce when they are above.
Our empirical results therefore point to the existence of a budget-maximising
local government, questioning the opportunity of further delegation of spending
powers to local governments, when unaccompanied by a corresponding increase
in their ￿scal responsibility and control over local spending.
The paper is organized as follows; the next section presents a short survey
of the economic literature on the local revenue-expenditure models. Section
3 estimates the long-run relationships among local expenditure, transfers and
taxes whereas section 4 reports the short-run equations allowing for asymmetric
and non-linear adjustment. Finally, section 5 provides some concluding remarks
and suggestions for further research.
2 Local Revenue-Expenditure Models and the
Fly-Paper E⁄ect.
Traditional economic literature on the revenue-expenditure patterns of local gov-
ernments has emphasised the existence of a "￿ y-paper" e⁄ect2. The ￿ y-paper
e⁄ect refers to the empirical regularity that the transfers-elasticity of local ex-
penditure is higher than its own-resources elasticity. It is important to consider
that the ￿ y-paper e⁄ect is not an anomaly3 within the rational choice, as ar-
gued by Hines-Thaler (1995), but, instead, it is a signal that local and central
2The term ￿￿ypaper￿is derived from the well-known remark by Arthur Okun that ￿money
sticks where it hits￿.
3See on this Roemer and Silvestre, 2002.
3governments might have di⁄erent (and potentially con￿ icting) objectives. This
happens because ￿scal discipline at a general government level has the charac-
teristics of a non-excludable public good4. As a consequence, there is a common
pool problem where local governments are incentived to overspend, to promote
the interests of the local citizens/taxpayers, in the case of a responsive govern-
ment, or of their elected politicians/bureaucrats in the case of a Leviathan-type
of government5.
The costs of the ￿ y-paper e⁄ect (state transfers to cover local ￿scal unbal-
ances, given the soft-budget constraint of local governments) will be shared at
a national level, while its advantages will be internalized by the single jurisdic-
tions. If the ￿ y-paper holds, delegation of spending powers to local jurisdictions,
unaccompanied by a corresponding increase in their ￿scal responsibilities, will
have the e⁄ect of expanding rather than contracting public sector size (Legrenzi
2000, Milas-Legrenzi 2002), as local governments are incentived to free-ride on
the national ￿scal discipline.
The ￿ y-paper e⁄ect has received considerable empirical support in the lit-
erature (Hines and Thaler 1995), but has generally being analysed under the
assumption of symmetry.
Under the hypothesis of symmetry, the local government reduces its expen-
ditures in response to reductions in transfers received, whereas in the presence of
asymmetries, the local government might decide to enhance its capacity to raise
revenues, in order to keep unchanged the level of local expenditure. This is the
so-called positive ￿scal replacement hypothesis, and it is empirically supported
4At a general government level, the ￿scal discipline can be identi￿ed in the compliance to
Maastricht and Amsterdam criteria for the EMU, while at a local level there is no such de￿n-
ition, although a local balanced budget would be desirable to achieve the nation￿ s budgetary
objectives.
5For further information on the distinction between ￿responsive￿and ￿excessive￿govern-
ment, see Buchanan (1977) and Legrenzi and Milas (2002).
4by Gramlich (1987), for the US. On the other hand, Paine and Stine (1994)
identify a ￿ super ￿ ypaper￿e⁄ect for a panel of Pennsylvania counties: when
grants are cut, own revenues also fall, resulting in a negative ￿scal replacement.
The ￿ndings of Gamkar and Oates (1996) for the US suggest that the ￿ ypaper
e⁄ect operates in both directions, providing no support in favor of asymmetric
behavior.
On the other hand, non-linearities may arise if the ￿scal authorities react
di⁄erently to deviations of state transfers from their equilibrium level. For
instance, the local authorities may be more willing to raise taxes rapidly when
they are below their equilibrium level with respect to transfers, rather than
lowering taxes rapidly when these are above their long-run level.
In the context of the European Stability and Growth Pact, testing for asym-
metries and non-linearities in the revenue-expenditure models becomes increas-
ingly important for economic policy purposes, in order to evaluate reforms in
the transfer system and the e⁄ectiveness of decentralization in constraining the
growth of government spending.
3 The Empirical Model.
We base our empirical analysis on the Italian municipalites. Italy is a member
country of the European Monetary Union with a typically high level of public
debt (around 122% of GDP in 2006), a high de￿cit (4.6% of GDP in 20066),
for which the control of public spending is particularly important. Increasing
the authonomy of local governments is highly debated in the political arena,
as a possible solution to constrain public expenditure growth. The ￿nancing of
6The data on the Italian de￿cit and debt are taken from the 2005 Annual Report of the
Italian Central Bank (Banca d￿ Italia).
5local expenditure is heavily reliant on transfer-￿nancing from the state, and the
Italian Constitution links the levels of transfers granted to local governments to
their "￿nancing needs".
Italian municipalities are the lowest level of local government in Italy, being
therefore closer both to the local preferences and the local costs conditions, with
respect to the central government. They enjoy some degree of ￿scal autonomy,
setting their own property taxes, and are responsible for the local public ser-
vices provision (transport and public utilities)7. Another advantage deriving
from the choice of the Italian municipalities derives from the policy switches
in their ￿scal autonomy. The 1973 reform limited the taxing powers of the
Italian municipalities, on the grounds of the higher e¢ ciency of a centralised
tax collection system. On the other hand, the reforms of the 1990s enhanced
the taxing powers of municipalities, increasing their autonomy, on the belief
that this would help constraining the public expenditure and help the country
to respect the EMU requirements8. An Internal Stability Pact was introduced
in 1999, requiring to extend to local governments the European Stability Pact
requirements, in the annual Budget Law. 9
Our sample consists of annual observations over the 1955-200310 period, and
is taken from the Italian o¢ cial statistics from ISTAT, in real terms. G measures
the expenditures of the Italian municipalities, TR the transfers received from
higher levels of government, and TAX the municipal taxation.
All the variables are expressed in logs. We chose annual data on the grounds
of the annual frequency of the budgetary choices of local governments. Higher
7For more detailed information on the competencies of the Italian municipalities, see
Legrenzi (2000).
8For further information and analysis on the Italian reforms, see OECD (2005).
9For a critical review on the reforms of the Italian ￿scal federalism, see Bordignon (2004).
10The year 2003 is the latest available in the national statistics. The data from 2001 onwards
are nevertheless provisional.
6frequency data will give us more degrees of freedom, but, nevertheless, will bias
the analysis, given the annuality of the municipal budgets11.
Levels and ￿rst di⁄erences of the variables are plotted in Figure 1.
Preliminary analysis of the time-series properties of the data suggested that
all variables are non-stationary in levels12 . Given the possible endogeneity
among the variables in question, we employ the Johansen approach to cointe-





￿i￿yt￿1 + ￿yt￿1 + ￿ + "t (1)
where yt = [G;TR;TAX]0 is the set of non-stationary I(1) variables discussed
above, "t ￿ niid(0;￿);￿ is a drift parameter, and ￿ is a (p ￿ p) matrix of the
form ￿ = ￿￿
0 , where ￿ and ￿ are (p ￿ r) matrices of full column rank, with ￿
containing the r cointegrating vectors and ￿ carrying the corresponding loadings
in each of the r vectors.
Allowing for an unrestricted intercept term and a lag length of k = 1 in
the VAR model13, Table 1 reports the ￿-max and the ￿-trace test statistics
for cointegration together with their corresponding 95% critical values (calcu-
lations are done in Micro￿t 4.1; see Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997, and in E-views
5.1). The empirical results provide evidence of two cointegrating vectors, which
is stronger for the ￿-max rather than the ￿-trace statistic. We consequently
proceed by assuming the existence of two cointegrating vectors. For exact iden-
11A further di¢ culty arises since the municipal ￿scal year does not coincide with the calendar
year, which forms the basis of the municipal data collection.
12Results are available on request.
13The k=1 is chosen by both the Schwarz information criterion and by the Hannan-Quinn
information criterion. The Akaike would have supported a lag lenght of 3. Given the small
sample considered, we set k=1 to avoid the loss of too many degrees of freedom.
7ti￿cation we impose a unit coe¢ cient on municipal expenditure (￿11 = 1) and
a zero coe¢ cient on taxes (￿13 = 0) in the ￿rst vector, and a unit coe¢ cient on
municipal taxation (￿23 = 1) and a zero coe¢ cient on municipal expenditure
(￿21 = 0)in the second one. These restrictions are justi￿ed on the grounds that,
given the possibility of one cointegrating vector based on the ￿￿trace statistics,
we also normalized on G and tested for zero long-run e⁄ects from taxes within
one cointegrating vector. This hypothesis was not rejected at conventional levels
of statistical signi￿cance14. This result motivates the exclusion of taxes from
the ￿rst cointegrating vector as a valid identifying restriction. We have also
tested for weak exogeneity of transfers for the rest of the system. This is a test
on the adjustment (alpha, ￿) coe¢ cient on TR in the two cointegrating vectors.
The test is a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test distributed as a ￿2(2) under the null,
giving a value of 4.204, which is insigni￿cant at the 5 percent level (p-value =
0.122). In statistical terms, weak exogeneity of transfers implies that we can
proceed by estimating short-run equations for G and TAX conditioning on TR
without loss of any signi￿cant information. In economic terms, conditioning on
transfers has the interpretation that within current local government ￿scal pol-
icy decision-making, state transfers are exogenous, con￿rming our normalization
choice.
Imposing the restrictions discussed above yields the following restricted
cointegrating vectors:
G = 0:71 TR (s.e.=.02) (2)
and
14Results are available on request.
8TAX = 0:50 TR (s.e.=.03) (3)
The highly positive coe¢ cient of transfers in the ￿rst vector con￿rms the
existence of a ￿ y-paper e⁄ect: a 10% increase in state transfers raises municipal
expenditure by 7%. The irrelevance of municipal taxation in determining lo-
cal expenditure represents a peculiarity of the Italian municipalities, which we
consider to be a ￿ strong￿version of the ￿ y-paper e⁄ect. This means that the
long-run equilibrium values of local expenditure are entirely driven by the level
of transfers received from higher levels of government.
The second cointegrating vector describes the relationship between local tax-
ation and state transfers. Local taxation in the long-run is expected to increase
by 5% in response to a 10% increase in state transfers. This means that in-
creases in state transfers do not bring tax relief to the community. In addition
to the long-run analysis, further useful insight to understand the spending and
taxing decisions of the Italian municipalities is provided in the short-run analysis
below.
4 Short-run adjustments of local taxes and spend-
ing.
Having veri￿ed the existence of a long-run equilibrium among the local ￿scal
policy variables, we model their short-run adjustments conditioning on transfers.
The two cointegrating vectors given by equations (2) and (3) above are denoted
by CV1 and CV2, respectively. We initially estimate a linear error-correction
model for local expenditure and local taxation and subsequently test for possi-
ble non-linearities. In case where the null of linear adjustment is rejected, we
proceed by estimating non-linear error-correction models.
9Various authors have examined non-linearities in the behavior of error cor-
rection models (see e.g. Granger and Lee, 1989; Escribano and Pfann, 1998;
Escribano and Granger 1998; and Escribano and Aparicio, 1999, among oth-
ers). In particular, Granger and Lee (1989) partition the error correction term
into its positive and negative components, and feed them back into the short-run
dynamic equation. The idea here is to test for di⁄erent speed of adjustments
depending on whether the ￿scal variables are above or below their unique (at
the zero point) equilibrium. However, imposing a unique equilibrium around
zero may be too restrictive. In order to relax this assumption, Escribano and
Granger (1998) and Escribano and Aparicio (1999) among others, use a cubic
error correction term. This type of nonlinear adjustment is more ￿ exible than
the Granger and Lee (1989) type of asymmetric adjustment as it allows for the
possibility of more than one equilibrium point. This type of non-linear adjust-
ment also allows for a faster adjustment when deviations from the equilibrium
level get larger.
4.1 Short-run adjustments of municipal expenditure.
We initially estimate the error correction model on the assumption of linear
response of municipal expenditure with respect to increases and decreases of
State transfers from their equilibrium value. The model estimated is therefore:
￿Gt = C + ￿1￿TAXt + ￿2￿TRt + ￿3CV 1
t￿1 + ut (4)
We also considered an EMU dummy, taking the value of 1 from 1993 onwards,
to capture the impact of the European Monetary Union, and a centralisation
dummy, taking the value of 1 between 1973 and 1990, to capture the central-
isation of tax collection under the 1973 reform. The Internal Stability Pact
10is captured by a dummy taking the value of 1 from 1999 onwards. All these
variables were statistically insigni￿cant in all models.
Regression results are reported in Table 2(i). The linear model is rather
poor, failing most of the diagnostic tests. This might be due to omitted non-
linearities. To detect this, we initially test for linearity in the residuals of the
error correction model. We apply the well known Brock, Dechert and Sheinkman
(1996, thereafter BDS) test statistic. Under the null hypothesis of linearity in
the residuals, the BDS test follows the normal distribution whereas rejection of
the null implies an unspeci￿ed non-linear structure15. Based on the p-values
associated with the BDS test, the results in Table 3 suggest the presence of
non-linear structure in the residuals of the error correction model.
Table 2 (columns (ii) and (iii)) reports the error correction equation based
on di⁄erent types of non-linear adjustment. First, as in Granger and Lee (1989),
we take the deviations of lagged CV1 around its mean value, and partition them





tively). Then, as in Escribano and Granger (1998) and Escribano and Aparicio
(1999), we estimate a cubic error correction model. More speci￿cally, we allow
for lagged CV2
1and CV3
1 to enter the short-run equation. The asymmetric model
takes the form:




1;t￿1 + zt (5)
The non-linear model takes the form:
￿Gt = C+￿1￿TAXt+￿2￿TRt+￿3CV1;t￿1+￿4CV 2
1;t￿1+￿5CV 3
1;t￿1+et (6)
15Several non-linearity tests exist in the literature. However, as Ashley and Patterson
(2001, p.20) point out, the BDS test is the best among di⁄erent tests for use as a non-linearity
screening test.
11The results in Table 2(ii) show the presence of an asymmetric adjustment
for local expenditure that relies on a downward in￿ exibility of this ￿scal policy
variable. Indeed, the coe¢ cient associated with the lagged value of CV
+
1 is
statistically insigni￿cant. This means that when local expenditure is below its
equilibrium level with state transfers, it increases relatively fast, whereas when
it is above its equilibrium, its reduction is not statistically signi￿cant.
The non-linear ECM results, in Table 2(iii), provides some evidence of pos-
sible non-linearities in the adjustment of local expenditure, given the statistical
signi￿cance at a 90% con￿dence level of the CV2
1 (but not the CV3
1) regressor.
Therefore, there is some evidence of a faster adjustment when deviations from
the equilibrium level get larger.
Next, we plot the asymmetric and non-linear types of adjustment against
CV1 (see Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively). From Figure 2 there is evidence
of asymmetric adjustment as the cross-plot is far from being a straight line.
The plot of the nonlinear cubic polynomial in Figure 3 suggests the existence of
asymmetric adjustment around a unique equilibrium point.
The recursive estimates of the asymmetric ECM for local spending, in Figure
6, verify the insigni￿cance of CV
+
1 as the estimates ￿ the 2 standard error bands
always include zero. On the other hand, the recursive estimates for CV
￿
1 suggest
that the asymmetry gets stronger over time, in the sense that the point estimate
starts from around -0.18 to reach -0.25 at the end of the sample.
4.2 Short-run adjustments of the local taxation.
We now report the ECM model for local taxation, allowing for possible non-
linear and asymmetric behaviour. Results are reported in Table 4. As for local
spending, we perform a BDS test on the residuals of the linear ECM. Based on
12the p-values associated with the BDS test, the results in Table 5 strongly suggest
the presence of non-linear structure in the residuals of the error correction model
for ￿TAX. Table 4(ii) and 4(iii) report the estimated error correction equation,







2 variables are constructed in the same way as the
corresponding CV1 regressors.
The results in Table 4(ii) demonstrate the presence of an asymmetric adjust-
ment for local taxation that relies on a downward in￿ exibility of this ￿scal policy
variable. Indeed, the coe¢ cient associated with the lagged value of CV
+
2 (i.e.
-0.01) is lower than the coe¢ cient on CV
￿
2 (i.e. -0.30), and it is also statistically
insigni￿cant. This means that when local taxes are below their equilibrium level
with respect to state transfers, they increase relatively fast, whereas when they
are above their equilibrium, they fall relatively slowly.
The non-linear ECM results in table 4(iii) show the existence of possible non-
linearities in the adjustment of local taxes, backed by the statistical signi￿cance
of the CV2
2 (but not the CV3
2 ) regressors. Therefore there is evidence of faster
adjustment when deviations from the equilibrium level get larger.
Next, we plot the asymmetric and non-linear types of adjustment against
CV2 (see Figure 4 and Figure 5, respectively). From Figure 4 there is evidence
of asymmetric adjustment as the cross-plot is far from being a straight line. The
plot of the nonlinear cubic polynomial in Figure 5 suggests the existence of one
equilibrium.
The recursively estimated coe¢ cients of the asymetric ECM for local taxa-
tion, plotted in Figure 7, show that the e⁄ect of the asymmetry is stable over
time.
Overall, our results point to some form of budget-maximising behaviour
13by the Italian local governments, that the di⁄erent reforms have so far been
unable to tackle. A stronger link between municipal expenditure and municipal
taxation, as well as spending and transfers reforms will be needed in order for
decentralisation to e⁄ectively constrain the growth of government spending in
Italy.
However, some caution must be taken when interpreting the results above.
The use of aggregate data has the e⁄ect of lumping together the responses of all
Italian municipalities, and therefore, the estimated response could re￿ ect some
mixture of symmetric and asymmetric coe¢ cients (Gamkhar and Oates, 1996).
Further, the degree of asymmetry might also depend on some characteristics of
the local jurisdictions, that cannot be captured by the aggregate data (Gamkar
and Oates, 1996). Territorial distinctions can also be relevant for Italy, given
the importance of state transfers to southern areas (see also OECD, 2005). On
the other hand, as our main focus is on the macro-economic impact of local ￿scal
policy, the use of aggregate data is necessary to assess the macro-asymmetries
in the local revenue-expenditure models.
5 Conclusions
This paper models the local revenue-expenditure relationship in the case of
Italian municipalities, using both linear and non-linear cointegrating techniques.
The long-run analysis shows the absence of a direct link between local ex-
penditure and taxation, as local spending is entirely driven by the amount of
transfers received by the central government. The short-run asymmetric model
shows evidence of revenue-maximising behaviour by local governments, driven
by the downward in￿ exibility of both local expenditure and taxation.
These results have important economic policy implications. First, the del-
14egation to local governments of further power to spend should be attached to
a higher level of ￿scal responsibility, that is linking local expenditure to local
taxation, in order for local governments to face an e⁄ective budget constraint. If
this were not the case, the decentralization of public expenditure might provide
the undesired outcome of an expansion rather than contraction in public sector
size, given the downward in￿ exibility of both the local ￿scal policy variables.
Further, the downward in￿ exibility of local expenditure appears to be a
relevant problem in this context, that so far has not been explicitly tackled by
the di⁄erent reforms, evidenced by the insigni￿cance of the policy dummies as
well by the analysis of the recursively estimated asymmetric ECM coe¢ cients.
There are at least two possible extensions of our analysis. First, territorial
and dimensional di⁄erences might be captured within a panel data model of
Italian municipalities. Second, it would be interesting to introduce and estimate
a two-regime smooth transition autoregression model (STAR, see e.g. Granger
and Terasvirta, 1993), where adjustment takes place in every period but the
speed of adjustment varies on whether disequilibrium deviations are large or
small. These issues can be addressed in future research.
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Note: CV1ASY = -0.08*CV1PLUS –0.22*CV1MINUS 
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Table 1.  Long-run analysis 
 
   λ-max     λ-trace    
H0  H1  Stat. 95%  H0  H1  Stat. 95% 
r=0 r=1 75.17  22.29  r=0  r>1 96.52  35.19 
r<1 r=2 18.56  15.89  r<1  r≥2  21.34 20.26 
r<2 r=3 2.78  9.16  r<2 r=3  2.78 9.16 
 
 
Table 2. Error correction models for local expenditure* 
 
  (i) (ii)  (iii) 
      
C  0.26 (.00)  0.07 (.00)  .08 (.00) 
ΔTR  0.10 (.01)  0.11 (.00)  .11 (.03) 
CV1  -0.14 (.00)  -  -.12 (.03) 
CV1PLUS(-1)  - -.08  (.09) - 
CV1MINUS(-1)  - -.22  (.00) - 
CV1
2 (-1)  - -  .13  (.15) 
CV1
3 (-1)  - -  -.16  (.47) 
      
Adjust. R
2 .47  .49  .49 
s.e. .05  .05  .05 
Breusch-Godfrey .83  .62  .89 
Heteroscedasticity .02  .14  .81 
RESET .19  .54  .73 
 
(*) Figures in parentheses are the p-values. Adjust. R
2 is the adjusted coefficient 
of determination of the regression. RESET is the Ramsey’s RESET test. 
(includes the square of the fitted value).   26
Table 3. BDS test on the residuals of the local expenditure linear ECM
1 
 
  = ε 0.025 = ε 0.05  = ε 0.10 
M      
      
2 0.94  0.53  0.27 
3 0.10  0.33  0.06 
4 0.00  0.03  0.31 




Table 4. Error correction models for local taxation. 
 
 
  (i) (ii)  (iii) 
      
C  .21 (.00)  .09 (.41)  .11 (.00) 
ΔTR  -.61 (.08)  -.41 (.25) -.38  (.17) 
CV2(-1)  -.20 (.00)  -  -.13 (.03) 
CV2PLUS(-1)  - -.01  (.95)  - 
CV2MINUS(-1)  - -.30  (.00) - 
CV2
2 (-1)  - -  .06  (.02) 
CV2
3 (-1)  - -  .01  (.79) 
      
Adjust. R
2 .18  .21  .20 
s.e. .45  .43  .43 
Breusch-Godfrey .12  .30  .28 
Heteroscedasticity .00  .00  .00 





                                                 
1  The BDS test statistic tests the null hypothesis that a series is i.i.d. 
against the alternative of realization from an unspecified non-linear 
process. m is the embedding dimension and ε equals 0.5σL, 1.0σL and 
2.0σL, respectively, where σL = 0.05 is the standard deviation of the 
residuals. Given that the choices of m and ε are crucial for the power of 
the test, we report the results for different plausible values of m and ε as 
suggested by Brock, Hsieh and LeBaron (1991). Only the bootstrapped p-
values are reported. 
   27
Table 5. BDS test on the residuals of the local taxation linear ECM. 
 
  = ε 0.225 = ε 0.45  = ε 0.90 
M      
      
2 0.00  0.00  0.00 
3 0.00  0.00  0.00 
4 0.00  0.01  0.00 
5 0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
Notes: see table (2c), with σL = 0.45. 
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